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Article
Divided Memories About Building Peace in
Chechnya (1995–2004)

Cécile Druey *
The conflicts in and around Chechnya are intractable, with a perceived impossibility to find a
negotiated solution. This paper focuses on the hostage crises of Budennovsk (1995) and Beslan
(2004) which are episodes from the two Chechnya Wars and had an important impact on their further
course. Based on the memories of key actors representing specific sides of the conflict, the paper
identifies and contextualizes diverging approaches to negotiations and conflict settlement.
Conceptual support for this analysis of open-source materials is provided by the theoretical literature
on “ripeness” and “readiness” as conditions for the initiation and successful conduction of
negotiations. The paper finds that it is not only the divisions between the different sides of the conflict
that affected the chances of negotiated peace, but those within the Russian and Chechen constitutions
themselves.
INTRODUCTION
Chechnya, today an Autonomous Republic in the mountainous South of the Russian Federation with
a population of just under one and a half million, looks back on several centuries of conflictual
relations with the central government in Moscow. During Perestroika and after the disintegration of
the Soviet Union in 1991, part of the Chechen population (again) dedicated itself to the struggle for
self-determination and independence, after which Moscow launched a full-fledged military invasion
of the Republic in November 1994. The ensuing armed conflict, officially referred to as the
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“Operation to Restore Constitutional Order” (President of the Russian Federation 1994), but widely
called the First Chechnya War, lasted several months, ending in August 1996 with the recapture of
the capital Grozny by the Chechen combatants and the conclusion of the agreement of Khasavyurt.
However, the following period of relative peace did not last long. In the autumn of 1999, the Russian
army launched its second armed “operation,” this time in the name of “counterterrorism” (President
of the Russian Federation 1999), commonly also referred to as the Second Chechnya War. Although
Moscow declared the end of the operation in 2009, the Second War has never been officially
concluded and no agreement was signed. For certain groups, it is therefore considered unresolved
and still ongoing.
Spanning a long period of time, involving several actors and affecting several social strata,
the conflict between Chechnya and Russia can be defined as a “protracted” (Azar 1990) or
“intractable conflict” (Bar-Tal, Halperin, and Pliskin 2015; Kriesberg 1993; 2010), which makes it
especially difficult to resolve peacefully. Moreover, in intractable conflicts, negotiation-oriented
“doves” face a hard time, and “hawks” who want to continue or solve the conflict by coercive and
unilateral means dominate the scene on both sides. “Doves” and “hawks” exist on both sides, the
Russian and the Chechen. Based on the memories of various actors involved, this article analyses the
trial of strength between “doves” and “hawks” and their different approaches to conflict management.
Using two key moments from the First and Second Chechen Wars as examples, namely the hostagetakings in Budennovsk (1995) and Beslan (2004), the paper asks why in certain contexts an approach
of negotiated peace prevails, whilst in others it does not.
The theories of conflict “ripeness” (I. W. Zartman 2001, 2015), as well as of the “readiness”
and “willingness” of actors to get involved in negotiations (Kleiboer 1994; Pruitt 2015) are helpful
to structure the analysis. Notably, they help to conceptually link outcomes, people (individuals or
groups) and contexts, and they enable an understanding of the dominance of either a “doves” or
“hawks” concept for peacebuilding during certain periods of time.
Using an interdisciplinary approach, this article contributes to various fields of research. It
provides a critical assessment of the narratives of mnemonic key actors involved in the conflict in
Chechnya and links them to the larger context of conflict and conflict resolution. This actors—and
context-based approach builds a conceptual bridge between memory studies and conflict contextbased approach builds a conceptual bridge between memory studies and conflict—and peace studies,
as well as area studies for the former Soviet space. The study is therefore equally interesting for
historians, social psychologists, political scientists, and specialists in international relations.
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METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
The article is based on data collected from two case studies, which are the hostage-takings of
Budennovsk (1995) and Beslan (2004). Now, one might ask why focus only on hostage-takings and
not on other episodes from the conflict? Hostage-takings and other forms of indiscriminate violence
against civilians are typical instruments of irregular warfare, used when fighting with equal means is
impossible or disadvantageous, and one side relies on it to gain a strategic advantage. According to
Stathis Kalyvas, such high-risk terrorist actions are an attempt by one side to show the “rival actor’s
inability to establish full control over large areas of the country”(Kalyvas 2006: 138). Hostagetakings and other terrorist activities can therefore become key moments in a war because—until
control is restored, or it is at least successfully portrayed as such—they can fundamentally alter the
balance of power, either in favour of the insurgents or in favour of the state. Depending on the
outcome, this can result in a context which is supportive or dismissive of negotiations.
The comparison of the examples of Budennovsk (1995) and Beslan (2004) is interesting,
because the two hostage-takings show many external similarities, but resulted in very different
outcomes: in both cases, the Chechen combatants acted under the leadership of the field commander
Shamil Basayev and targeted civilian institutions in Russian or pro-Russian territories of the North
Caucasus, but outside the immediate zone of conflict. However, if “Budennovsk” opened the door
for negotiations between the conflict parties, with “Beslan” this window was definitively closed.
As an empirical base for the analysis, the article uses open-source materials associated with
the different sides of the conflict and presenting their specific mnemonic narratives about what
happened in 1995 and in 2004 respectively. In the article memories are used as empirical data, instead
of other primary materials such as newspapers, political statements, or data from private archives.
This is because the primary aim of the paper is not to recount what happened in the past, but to
reconstruct and compare the diverging perspectives of the involved sides." Memories are a significant
methodological tool in conflict and peace research. They link a (real or imagined) past to the present,
helping mnemonic actors to frame their political and military deeds of the present and the past in a
certain way. According to scholars who specialize in the study of memory and conflict, mnemonic
narratives can act in a way that supports both conflict and peace (Bar-Tal, Oren, and Nets-Zehngut
2014; Bar-Tal 2013; Volkan 2001; Cobb 2013). Analyzing them is therefore particularly important
in order to understand conflicts in more depth and to find appropriate entry-points for peacebuilding.
The study of mnemonic narratives also allows for a better understanding of the dividing lines and the
underlying causes of conflict. (Cobb 2013) This is especially important for the analysis of intractable
conflicts, which span over a long period of time and affect all layers of society. These types of conflict
are especially difficult to resolve and can easily result in a (re-)escalation. In the case of Chechnya,
this “intractability” becomes evident in the interplay of “doves” and “hawks,” and in the
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powerlessness of the former vis-à-vis the latter in the context of the increasing militarization of
political discourse under Vladimir Putin.
TERMS IN USE
At this point, a few terms should be clarified that are important for the paper’s further analysis.
Conflict management and conflict resolution
Armed conflicts involve various actors and political levels, and there are many different strategies
about how peace can, or should, be restored. “Conflict management” is understood here as a concept
based mainly on the maintenance or restoration of military stability and focusses on a short-term
management of violence, while it leaves the political and psycho-social dimension of the conflict
largely unaddressed (or “frozen”). Conflict management also includes the possibility of using a
“carrot and stick” method to put pressure on the conflict parties. (W. Zartman and Touval 1985: 263;
Richmond 2005: 89–96; Paffenholz 2010: 51) The “management” of violence should not be confused
with “conflict resolution.” The latter intends to be a fully-fledged “transformation of the relationship
between the parties” (Kelman 2010, 2) and addresses the settlement of the conflict in a broader
perspective, including the negotiation of a political solution (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall
2016; Darby and Mac Ginty 2003) and overcoming the psycho-social consequences of the conflict
(Lederach 1997; Bar-Tal 2013; Kelman 2010).
‘Hawks’ and ‘doves’
In this article, the term ‘hawks’ is used to describe individuals who generally rely on the use of
unilateral and often forceful means as a primary approach to deal with conflicts. This means that an
insurgency, such as the one that erupted in Chechnya, is perceived to be overcome only by the total
annihilation of the adversary or by its expulsion from the contested territory. Beyond its military
significance, the term also includes “ideological hawks,” whose actions and thinking are defined by
a higher political goal. In their understanding, the use of force is reasonable not only as a pragmatic
means to reach a military goal, but also due to a higher logic of some “holy war.” In the language of
Max Abrahms, “ideological hawks” thus pursue maximalist “outcome goals” (Abrahms 2012: 367),
intending to fundamentally change the existing political order and to impose their own ideology on
the adversary (Abrahms 2012).
“Doves” are defined in the classical literature as co-operators, whereas they usually develop
a peacebuilding impact only if they meet an equally cooperative counterpart, or act as pairs (Pilisuk,
Potter, and Winter 1965). As this article understands the term, ‘doves’ use negotiations as a means to
solve problems of armed violence, including acts of terrorism, with a focus on saving human lives.
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Furthermore, the focus of “doves” is not only on a purely military pacification of the conflict, but
aimed at a larger and more sustainable conflict resolution, including political settlement (Hansen,
Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse 2004).
THE BUDENNOVSK HOSTAGE CRISIS (1995)
On 14 June 1995, a group of between 150 to 180 Chechen combatants under the leadership of field
commander Shamil Basayev entered the town of Budennovsk in Southern Russia, took between 1500
and 2000 hostages, including civilians, local security forces, local authorities, hospital patients and
medical personnel, and occupied the Budennovsk hospital and adjacent buildings. Basayev issued an
ultimatum to the Russian government, that the Russian army, which had been waging its armed
“Operation to restore constitutional order” (President of the Russian Federation 1994) in Chechnya
for six months, should stop hostilities and withdraw its troops immediately. 1 President Yeltsin, who
was abroad at that moment, did not react to this demand. Instead, on the orders of key decisionmakers responsible for security policy, elite troops of the Ministry of the Interior, the so-called Alpha
and Vega groups, were deployed to Budennovsk in order to deal with the terrorists. Early in the
morning on 17 June 1995, they started storming the hospital, with the result that several dozen
hostages who were taken as living shields by their captors died from Russian bullets, and hundreds
were injured. In parallel to the storming of the hospital, different Russian actors had begun
negotiations with the hostage takers. The delegation which was finally successful in brokering a
compromise was made up of State Duma parliamentarians and human rights activists, under the lead
of the former Ombudsman for Human Rights, Sergey Kovalev. The result of the Budennovsk hostage
crisis, according to reports shared in 2020, was the death of 129 hostages and local police, three Alpha
fighters and about 15 Chechen combatants. Numerous people were wounded on both sides and there
was major damage to the local infrastructure (Kotlyar, Kazakova, and Korzakov 2020; Charny 2020;
Kolosova, Gritsenko, and Bondarenko 2020).
Based on the accounts of different groups of actors, who recalled memories of the events
from various perspectives, this subchapter reconstructs the controversial discussions about the
context and the significance of the Budennovsk hostage crisis and its resolution. The article focuses
on the narratives of three mnemonic actors who were involved in the Budennovsk hostage crisis in
1995. Each of these narratives emerged and was cultivated in a specific political context and, as such,
serves certain political aims: whereas the Russian authorities’ account of “Budennovsk” emphasizes
its significance for counter-insurgency and the fight against terrorism, the Chechen diaspora and
former combatants present the hostage-taking against the backdrop of the Russian war against
Chechnya and the consolidation of Chechen statehood and independence; Russian human rights
activists, on the other hand, who mediated a compromise between the Russian leadership and the
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Chechen fighters in 1995, focus on the successful mediation effort and on the failings of the Russian
government.
OFFICIAL RUSSIA AND THE NARRATIVE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
Mnemonic actors close to the Russian government today describe the Budennovsk hostage-taking as
the first large-scale manifestation of a terrorist Chechen underground, which would commit many
more similar misdeeds throughout Russia in the years to come. The image of the hostage-takers
involved, who were, and still are, dismissed in the Russian media as the “scum of society” and
“criminals,” is correspondingly negative (Rossiya 1 2020). The military, socio-cultural and legal
arguments, as they are presented in today’s official discourse, place “Budennovsk” in the narrative
framework of a global campaign against terrorism which has, however, specifically Russian features.
Like a powerful ideology, this “War on Terror” à la russe, has increasingly dominated the official
Russian discourse since the turn of the millennium, originating in the Kremlin’s second military
campaign and the ensuing “mop-up” operations in Chechnya since 1999, and receiving new impetus
and international acceptance after the 9/11 attacks and the declaration of the “Global War on Terror.”
This domestic Russian “War on Terror” took place mainly at a political level and is first and
foremost a discursive construction, where “Budennovsk” and the way the crisis is remembered plays
an important role. The constructed nature of the government’s mnemonic narrative today is
underlined by the fact that the terms “terrorism” and “terrorists” were still largely absent from public
debates in Russia in 1995. The Russian media of that time would rather talk of “fighters” (Topol
1995) and “gunmen” (RFE/RL 1995).
“BUDENNOVSK” AND THE CLAIM FOR CHECHEN SOVEREIGNTY
In the memories of the Chechen diaspora, which mostly speaks out in favour of the vision of selfdetermination embodied in the de-facto independent “Republic of Chechnya-Ichkeriya” of the 1990s,
supports the perspective of the former combatants implementing the hostage-taking. Their memories
present “Budennovsk” as an element of successful state-building and underline the importance of the
political negotiation process that began after the hostage-taking in summer 1995. During these
negotiations, the Chechen de-facto authorities, under the leadership of President Djokhar Dudayev,
were directly represented at the table for the first time and held face-to-face talks with their Russian
counterpart. Moreover, the fact that the Russian Prime-Minister Victor Chernomyrdin was
temporarily involved in the resolution of the hostage-crisis is seen as a kind of recognition of Chechen
statehood (Vatchagaev 2019, Akhmadov and Lanskoy 2010). State-building in this context also
means nation-building, with Shamil Basayev remembered as a fierce defender of the interests of his
compatriots. In the (albeit somewhat romanticizing) memory of Duma deputy Yuliy Rybakov,
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Basayev acted as a kind of “Caucasian Robin Hood,” and his attack on Budennovsk first and foremost
served the consolidation of the Chechens as a newly independent community:
Immediately after entering the village [and releasing the voluntary hostages in
1995r – C.D.], Basayev lined up his fighters, took off his hat and told us: 'I did
what I did to you, and I acted like a dog. That's how it happened... But I had no
other option, I had to save my people!" Then he turned around and, together with
his unit, disappeared into the woods….(www.warchechnya.ru 2018)
THE KOVALEV-GROUP: A VICTIMS-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE
The Russian liberal parliamentarians and human rights activists under the lead of the former
Ombudsman for Human Rights Sergey Kovalev acted as mediators between combatants and the
Russian authorities. They arrived in Budennovsk on the evening of 16 June 1995. As they reported
in 2020, their initial aim was to support the staff headquarters of the Russian armed forces in their
attempt to negotiate a solution without bloodshed among civilians. However, they found that the staff
headquarters perceived their intention to mediate and their mere presence as an open threat (Nemzer
2020).
Beyond their concern for the fate of the hostages, Kovalev and his group also showed a
certain understanding for the other side, and a will to find a mutually satisfying solution for the
Chechen attackers and their claims. Massacres and other forms of indiscriminate violence committed
by the Russian armed forces during the first months of the war had resulted in humanitarian hardship
and a feeling of injustice and discrimination for large parts of the Chechen population (Blinushov
1996; Gilligan 2009; Kavkazskiy Uzel 2019). From this perspective, it was therefore only logical that
the Chechens retaliated with equally cruel means, including the use of indiscriminate violence against
civilians. To stop the spiral of radicalization, there was an urgent need for negotiations to bring the
needs and interests of all groups involved to the table. This approach stands in strong contrast to the
traditional violence-and casualty-intensive approach to conflict management of the Russian (and
Soviet) security sector. The focus on negotiation and compromise also explains why the mediators
were attacked from all sides.
THE HOSTAGE-TAKING OF BESLAN (2004)
In Beslan, a small town in the North Caucasus located in the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia,
where the majority of the population is Orthodox Christian, a squad of combatants mainly from the
neighbouring republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia stormed the building of the “School No. 1” on
the morning of 1 September 2004. In addition to the pupils (aged between seven and eighteen years
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old) and teachers, many parents were also gathered there at that time to celebrate the start of the
school year. The attackers were heavily armed and took more than 1000 pupils, teachers, and parents
as hostages. Local police, army and intelligence forces (OMON) were quick to surround the school
and were later joined by the special forces Alfa and Vympel. The Russian government initially
announced that it would not use force in order to protect the lives of the hostages, who were mostly
children, and would negotiate in order to avoid bloodshed. However, except for one meeting with the
hostage-takers by the former President of Ingushetia (Ruslan Aushev), no negotiations took place.
During the following storming of the school buildings, the roof of the gym hall collapsed and buried
many people underneath it. According to official figures, 331 persons, more than one quarter of the
hostages, lost their lives. Over half of the victims were children (Griess 2019).
Memories of the events in Beslan are not only controversial, but also often very emotional
and traumatic. In addition to several media reports, there are also a number of film and audio
documents produced that try to analyze and cope with the experience in very different ways. There
is also a lively culture of remembrance among the civilian population in Beslan and other Russian
cities, where commemorative events are regularly held in honour of the victims. However, the
following sections of this paper look at the hostage-taking not from a perspective of the most
frequently quoted mnemonic actors, which are the former hostages and victims’ representatives.
Rather, in order to maintain an analytical focus on negotiation, the chapter will concentrate on the
accounts of the conflicting parties, namely the official Russian authorities and the former combatants
and de-facto authorities of Chechnya.
“BESLAN” IN THE ACCOUNTS OF OFFICIAL RUSSIA
Official sources close to the Russian authorities present the hostage-takers as exclusively responsible
for the high numbers of casualties. According to the state-owned news agency “RIA Novosti,” the
combatants shot hostages randomly and used indiscriminate violence against civilian hostages,
including children (RIA Novosti 2008; 2014; 2020). The commemorative articles underline the
responsibility of the Russian state and the whole nation, not only of individual groups, to cherish the
memory of “Beslan.” At first glance, this sounds like a recognition of the claims of the victims, but
it also means that the state determines how this memory of victimhood is to be shaped. In the state’s
interpretation, the memory of the hostage crisis itself is often overshadowed by the image of a
successful “fight against terrorism” by the Russian government. In 2005, in honor of the events in
Beslan, the Third of September was declared a “day of solidarity in the fight against terrorism.” 2
Hence, in parallel to the narrative of the civilian victims, the Russian state has actively constructed a
parallel memory of “Beslan” which glorifies the special forces as having defeated the terrorists; it
poses them as rescuers with children in their arms (RIA Novosti 2020; 2014; 2008). 3
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The Russian authorities, especially the intelligence services responsible for handling
“Beslan,” were repeatedly criticized by independent media and victims’ organizations; firstly, for the
deliberate spread of false information in state media in order to present the actions of the security
forces in the most favourable light possible, secondly, for the total refusal to negotiate, and thirdly,
for the disproportionate use of heavy weapons. Hence, the siloviki (“power men,” security forces)
were accused of intending primarily to destroy the terrorists, not to rescue the hostages. Reacting to
this criticism, the official discourse post-hoc frames the “no negotiation” approach of the security
forces in 2004 as the only legally possible option, with potential negotiations with the hostage-takers
being strictly forbidden by the recently revised anti-terror legislation (RIA Novosti 2020). Another
feature of the official narrative on “Beslan” is the clear attribution of blame, which avoids going into
detail about the origin and demands of the hostage-takers. In “RIA Novosti’s” account, the main
perpetrators of the hostage-taking include the field commander Shamil Basayev and Aslan
Maskhadov, then president of the de-facto independent Chechnya-Ichkeriya Republic, triumphantly
adding that by today, they were all “annihilated” (RIA Novosti 2008) or “liquidated” (RIA Novosti
2020). In particular, the mention that Maskhadov was involved aimed to discredit the de-facto
government in Grozny and the Chechen independence movement as a whole; Maskhadov himself
and other high-ranking representatives of the Ichkerian government virulently denied any role in the
hostage taking (Akhmadov and Lanskoy 2010).
THE CHECHEN INSURGENTS: DIVIDED OPINIONS
When analyzing the “Beslan” memory of former combatants and state representatives from
Chechnya, it is difficult to rely upon the direct memories of eye-witnesses, as these have been largely
eradicated from public debates due to death or imprisonment. However, a number of indirect sources,
such as reposts of interviews and analytical materials published in social media close to the Chechen
movement of independence, or memoirs published by former authorities in Grozny who are not in
the diaspora, enable the perspectives of the insurgents to be reconstructed.
There is no one Chechen account of “Beslan.” Rather, it is divided into at least two sets of
voices; more radical voices, which place the terrorist attack in the tradition of an Islamist and allCaucasian insugency calling for a djihad (“Holy War”) against the kafirs (“infidels”), and more
moderate voices, which judge it from the nationalist perspective of the de facto authorities in Grozny.
The Islamist narrative was supported by a repost of an undated interview with the field commander
Shamil Basayev by the Chechen diaspora internet platform “Kavkazcenter”(Kavkazcenter 2021). 4 In
the interview Basayev states the aims of the hostage-taking in Beslan, which were stopping the
Russian-led “genocide” in Chechnya, including a full withdrawal of troops and opening peace talks
between Chechnya and Russia. Furthermore, he compares “Beslan” and “Budennovsk”: according to
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him, the aims and methods of both sides basically remained the same. However, what had changed
was the context—which also explains why the insurgents’ “success” of 1995 could not be repeated
in 2004. In Putin’s Russia, an independent press that could disseminate the claims of the insurgents
and influence public opinion and political decision making no longer existed; furthermore, Basayev
says that the FSB (“Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti,” intelligence services) were now the only
actor in charge on the Russian side, opting for a solution by force and aborting all attempts of official
and private mediators to initiate negotiations with the hostage-takers. Finally, Basayev takes full
responsibility for what happened in Beslan; he expresses his deep concern that children were killed.
However, in his opinion it is Russia, and only Russia, who should be blamed for the bloodshed
(Kavkazcenter 2021; 2004). It is not only the content of Basayev’s speech which is interesting, but
also the symbolic setting in which it was taken. During his speech, Basayev sits in front of a flag
which displays the Arabic lettering Allahu akbar! (“Allah is great!”). This demonstrates an affiliation
of the Chechen independence movement (or at least of Basayev as one of its prominent leaders) with
the international Islamist community, which in 1995 was not openly displayed. Furthermore, during
the broadcast Basayev wears a protective vest with the inscription antiterror. This reverses the
Russian narrative of “counterterrorism” in an almost ironical way, accusing the Russian adversaries
and their local vassals, rather than Caucasian independence fighters, of terrorism, and justifying the
use of force as a legitimate countermeasure (Kavkazcenter 2021).
In contrast to Basayev, the authorities in Grozny clearly condemned the hostage-taking.
Ilyas Akhmadov, advisor to Presidents Dudayev and Maskhadov, friend of Basayev and himself
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chechnya-Ichkeriya from 1999 to 2002, wrote in his memoirs that
“Beslan” morally “stands completely outside all coordinates,” (Akhmadov and Lanskoy 2010: 223)
and that after the hostage-taking “the Chechen cause lost all its supporters overnight” (Akhmadov
and Lanskoy 2010: 227). He understood it as an aberration of the extremist wing of the Chechen
insurgency, an attempt to “repeat Budennovsk,” where Chechen “radicals came up with the formula
of using terrorism to force the beginning of talks” (Akhmadov and Lanskoy 2010: 174). Whereas this
approach might have been partially successful in 1995, it greatly harmed the Chechen government in
the 2000s, which was in a much weaker position by that time. According to Akhmadov, this was
especially detrimental for President Maskhadov who tried hard to “exert control and assert himself
as a credible interlocutor” (Akhmadov and Lanskoy 2010: 187).
Unexpected support for the posthumous restoration of Maskhadov's credibility comes from
former Kremlin dignitaries. Andrey Illarionov, Russian economist and personal representative of
Vladimir Putin to the G8 until 2005, remembers in an interview with Radio Svoboda that during the
hostage-taking, he tried jointly with the Chechen president to persuade Vladimir Putin to allow
Maskhadov to negotiate with the hostage-takers in order to save the children. However, according to
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Illarionov, Putin denied safe passage to Maskhadov several times, and when the latter said he would
go to Beslan anyway, the Russian forces started to storm the school buildings (Velekhov 2016).
THE CONTEXT: FROM 1995 TO 2004
The following section aims to better understand the processes and events that contributed to, or
resulted from, “Budennovsk” and “Beslan,” contextualizing the two hostage crises at local, regional
and international levels. This should further allow conclusions to be drawn in terms of the “ripeness”
of the situation and the disposition of the key actors speaking for or against a negotiated settlement.
At a local level, the Chechen independence movement reached new heights in 1995, with a
successful mobilization of combatants as a result of grievances and in-war radicalization. Despite the
resistance of hardliners, who were aiming for a purely military victory against Russia, the Chechen
de-facto government was actively engaged in a process of political statebuilding, which was reflected
in its support for negotiations on Chechnya’s future status. By 2004, the balance of power between
radicals and moderates had changed. As is also reflected in the mnemonic narratives on “Beslan,” the
Russian counter-insurgency and massive use of indiscriminate violence during the Second Chechnya
War severely tested the Chechens' will to resist; the loss of life and destruction were enormous, and
the population was increasingly tired of the war. Furthermore, the Chechen independence movement
was more and more split between the radical Islamists, who wanted a djihad or “total war” against
Russia and admitted also terrorist means of conflict, and the more moderated nationalists or
“Ichkerians,” who fought for political independence. The gradual prevailing of the former and
marginalization of the latter resulted in an ideological shift from nationalism to Islamism, which
happened as a result of the radicalization and internal fragmentation of the Chechen society during
the Second War, and also due to Russian military repression and the “de-capitation” of the
insurgency. (Ratelle 2021) “Beslan” thus signified the end of the Chechen movement of
independence, as a result of Russian counter-insurgency and the Islamization and regionalization 5 of
the conflict (Akhmadov and Lanskoy 2010; Vatchagaev 2021).
At a national level, the hostage-taking of Budennovsk (1995) took place amidst the domestic
turmoil of the First Chechnya War (1994–1996). Military failures and high casualties among the
mostly very young soldiers during the first months of the war exposed organizational and personnel
shortcomings in the Russian army and led to increased discontent among the population (Specter
1997). These structural deficiencies were also one of the reasons why Moscow suffered a military
defeat in August 1996, with the recapture of Grozny by the Chechens. Furthermore, the Yeltsin
government was still politically weakened after the constitutional crisis of 1993 and often criticized,
notably by its parliamentarians. Yeltsin was also in the vulnerable position of a soon to be re-elected
presidential candidate and could not afford to turn the electorate against him. The political

53 Divided Memories and Building Peace
environment of the mid-1990s in Russia was relatively pluralist and democratic, meaning that civil
society and independent media were able to exert at least some control over the government and the
security sector. By 2004, the situation had completely changed. Although during “Beslan” the Second
Chechen War was still ongoing, this war was much less present in Russian society. Amongst other
factors, this was a result of the increasing “securitization” 6 of the insurgency in the North Caucasus,
which was now being handled as a “matter in chief” of the president and his close associates. Seminal
for Russia’s political and military development after “Beslan” was President Putin’s speech of 4th
September 2004. In it, Putin announced drastic measures, including the consolidation and
centralization of state power, the declaration of the North Caucasus as a zone in need of special
attention and control, and the valorization of the security apparatus as the main organization
responsible for dealing with the threat of “international terror,” which, according to him, was leading
a “total, cruel and full-scale war” against Russia (President of the Russian Federation 2004). In this
context, in the Kremlin’s official narrative “Beslan” became the justification to launch a new and
even more vigorous effort to definitively crush the power of the independent Chechen government
under Aslan Maskhadov, and to consolidate the position of the new government loyal to the Kremlin
under the Kadyrov clan, which had implemented Moscow’s “counter-terrorist” campaign in the North
Caucasus in an even more vigorous and authoritarian way (Dannreuther and March 2008; Lyall 2010;
Russell 2014). 7
At an international level, too, the Russian government’s approaches to conflict management
in the North Caucasus was an issue of debate. In the 1990s, there was an active interest and support
amongst Russian and international civil society for the Chechen claims of self-determination and
independence, and the Russian attempts to solve the disputes purely by force were strongly criticized.
At the same time, state-sponsored criticism of Russia’s transgressions in the Caucasus was more
cautious, as Western governments feared that an overly harsh condemnation of Yeltsin and his
government would jeopardize the precarious transformation process Russia was at that time
undergoing. In 2004, the geo-political considerations of Western states and international
organizations clearly outweighed the outraged reactions of civil society and the international human
rights community. At Russia’s request, a special session of the UN Security Council was held on the
evening of 1 September 2004, on the first day of the hostage-taking, after which U.S. President
George W. Bush offered Russia support (UN Security Council 2004). In other words, “Beslan”
further cemented the international alliance against the “War on Terror,” in turn giving the Kremlin
free rein over how it suppressed protests which qualified as “terror” in Russia.
“DOVES” AND “HAWKS” IN PEACEMAKING: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACTORS’
AVAILABILITY AND WILLINGNESS
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An important factor determining the right moment or the “ripeness” for negotiations is the
availability, willingness and ability of the involved actors—which, in turn, also depend on the
situations within the negotiating actors’ constituencies (Pruitt 2015; Kleiboer 1994). These internal
conditions and their impact on the course of the war and the attitudes toward conflict management
are the focus of this chapter.
The two wars in Chechnya, against the backdrop of which the hostage-takings in
Budennovsk and Beslan took place, were not merely (inter-ethnic) conflicts between Moscow and
Grozny, or between Russians and Chechens, but they also exposed significant rifts within these
groups. On either side there is a trial of strength between “hawks,” who rely on the unilateral use of
force and the annihilation of the enemy as a primary means of conflict management, and “doves,”
who favour political negotiations and a focus on “saving human lives” as a way to reach peace.
In order to develop a peacebuilding impact, “doves” have to meet an equally cooperative
counterpart on the other side of the conflict, which allows them to act in pairs; this is what we know
from the classical literature on peacebuilding. (Pilisuk, Potter, and Winter 1965) “Budennovsk”
represents an important turning point in the course of the war, as it opened up opportunities for the
“doves” on both sides to act.
Key people on the Russian side who made the opening of negotiations possible were Prime
Minister Victor Chernomyrdin (Akhmadov and Lanskoy 2010; Nemzer 2020), and the human rights
activists under the leadership of Sergey Kovalev, who acted as mediators and brokered a compromise
with the hostage-takers. Furthermore, in the aftermath of “Budennovsk,” General Aleksandr Lebed
played a crucial for the successful completion of the negotiations, including signing the ceasefire and
demilitarization agreement of Khasavyurt (August 1996).
On the Chechen side, the “doves” pushing for a negotiated, political resolution were in a
difficult situation in June 1995, as the Chechen combatants were about to succumb to Russia’s
overwhelming military force. However, Basayev and his “hawkish” and violent methods used in
Budennovsk created a new momentum for these Chechen “doves.” The peace negotiations that started
in July 1995 signified at least a partial recognition of the de-facto government of Chechnya-Ichkeria
and resulted in its quasi-full control on the territory of the republic. Throughout the time span studied
here, Aslan Maskhadov played a role as a “dove” on the Chechen side, first as head of the Chechen
armed forces and a signatory of “Khazavyurt.” and since 1997 as the elected president of the
Republic. He was generally portrayed as having a conciliatory and compromise-oriented personality,
not only when dealing with foreign relations, but also regarding his attempts to settle internal disputes
(Sokiryanskaya 2014; Kavkazcenter 2019; Akhmadov and Lanskoy 2010).
At a level of foreign policy, the rise of the “doves” in the mid-1990s was reflected not only
in the influence of conciliatory individuals on political decision-making processes on both sides, but
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also in the Kremlin’s attitudes towards international peacebuilders and third-party mediators: if
multilateral channels of dialogue and negotiation were not actively sought, they were in the 1990s at
least tolerated. In the months leading up to the conclusion of the Khasavyurt Agreement, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its “OSCE Assistance Group to
Chechnya” under the leadership of the Swiss diplomat Tim Guldimann played a particularly central
role as an international third-party mediator. It was this “Group” that hosted the talks of the Chechen
and Russian delegations and carefully accompanied the key actors ready for dialogue on both sides,
supporting them against the “hawks” in their own constituencies (Guldimann 1998). As a result, the
negotiation process of 1995–96, although marked by great difficulties and setbacks, resulted in a
rapprochement especially in the military sphere.
The rise of “doves” in the aftermath of “Budennovsk” was followed by their gradual
marginalization and the subsequent triumph of “hawks” on both sides. The military pacification
enshrined in the Khasavyurt Agreement was not followed by a more comprehensive process of
conflict resolution. On the Russian side, many, especially among the security sector, felt humiliated
by the military defeat and Moscow’s retreat from the Caucasus, and as a result hardliners who were
forced to resign after “Budennovsk” were rehabilitated on the political scene during the following
years. 8 On the Chechen side, too, the interwar period starting in August 1996 brought with it a
constant tug-of-war between the “doves” (seeking a political arrangement) and the “hawks” (refusing
all cooperation with Russia), with the international policy of Chechnya’s non-recognition and
isolation, and persisting rule of law problems at an internal level contributing to the Islamic
radicalization and regionalization of the insurgency (Roshchin 2014; Wilhelmsen 2005). At the same
time, “doves” like President Maskhadov, who desperately tried to prevent the Chechen state and
society from crumbling apart, came under increasing pressure (Sokiryanskaya 2014).
It becomes clear that the strengthening of the “hawks” and the marginalization of the
“doves” was a reciprocal process that took place both in Russia and in Chechnya. In view of this
mutual radicalization and of the renewed escalation of the armed conflict in late 1999, an even more
pronounced consolidation of the Russian “no-negotiations” approach became only logical, with
Russia relying on unilateral measures which were narratively legitimized as counterterrorism.
Vladimir Putin, the figurehead of this new securitization of the North Caucasus, can thus be
characterized as something like a “superhawk.”
“RIPENESS” and “READINESS” IN 1995 AND 2004: A COMPARISON
Both hostage-takings in the focus here marked a turning point in the armed conflict: “Budennovsk”
prepared the ground for the Khasavyurt Agreement, which put an end to the First Chechnya War in
1996, and “Beslan” marked the end of the Chechen nationalist insurgency and the consolidation of a
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unilateral peace under Russian lead. This section discusses the (im)possibilities of broader peace
negotiations during these moments.
According to William Zartman, the “ripeness” of the moment is one of the most important
conditions for the opening and conducting of successful negotiations for peace. This “ripeness” stems
from military exhaustion and a situation perceived as a “mutually hurting stalemate” on both (or all)
sides of the conflict and is reinforced by the feeling of a past, impending or narrowly avoided
catastrophe, and by the availability of a “Way Out” (I. W. Zartman 2001: 8–9). However important,
“ripeness” alone is not a sufficient condition for the opening and completion of negotiations. The
parties also need to be ready to seize the occasion for de-escalation, either directly or through the
persuasion of a mediator, and a ”Way Out” needs to be fleshed out, usually in form of an agreement
regulating issues of ceasefire and de-militarization, power-sharing and post-conflict reconstruction
(I. W. Zartman 2001: 2015). This “seizure” is where Zartman’s theory on “ripeness” meets with the
ideas on “readiness” (Pruitt 2015; Kleiboer 1994; 1996) and “willingness” (Kleiboer 1994). Notably,
with a reinforced focus on actors, the “readiness” theorists also emphasize the impact of internal
developments within the parties’ constituencies on their preference for managing the conflict. Thus,
the opening and implementation of negotiations for a peaceful settlement also depends on a trial of
strength between “doves” and “hawks” on both sides, as was skillfully demonstrated by Dean Pruitt
among others during the pre-negotiations for the Oslo peace process (Pruitt 2015: 124–27).
The tables below (Annexes 1 and 2) give a comparative overview of the contextual elements
that supported or prevented peace negotiations in 1995 and 2004, following the concepts of “ripeness”
and “readiness.” They show that the elements supporting the “ripeness” of the conflict for a
negotiated settlement and the availability and “readiness” of responsible actors to seize this possibility
were much more pronounced in 1995 and completely absent in 2005. The relative “ripeness” after
Budennovsk had a lot to do with the shift of control and of the balance of power between the two
sides, which, in turn, had an impact on their “readiness” for negotiations. As we have learned from
Kalyvas, (2006) hostage takings and other terrorist acts are tactical attempts of one side to alter the
distribution of power by showing that the other side is losing control over a certain territory. This is
exactly what happened in our case studies.
The hostage crises in both Budennovsk and Beslan have hit the Russian and international
public like a bombshell. Especially before “Budennovsk,” people were not much interested in the
activities of the Russian army in faraway Chechnya, where the territorial integrity and law and order
needed to be restored. However, the two hostage-takings suddenly brought the war to the Russian
heartland and demonstrated that the Chechens could hit the enemy anywhere, causing Moscow to
lose control of the situation. Such shifts in control can create a new context which is supportive (or
dismissive) of negotiations. In the case of “Budennovsk,” where the power shift was in favour of the
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insurgents, it made an inclusive format possible, with both parties represented at the negotiation table.
After “Beslan,” on the other hand, the Chechen side emerged severely weakened, which made it easy
for the Russian “siloviki” to present themselves as victors and dictate their own terms of conflict
management, summarized as an approach of “no-negotiations” and Pax russica.
Via broadcast, field commander Basayev made public in 1995 the atrocities of the Russian
army and the demands of the Chechen population for peace, causing the Kremlin, led by Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin, to work hard to defuse the crisis. Whilst in direct contact with the hostagetakers, a compromise was negotiated that included the opening of peace negotiations. “Budennovsk”
is one of the rare historical examples where not only was the Russian government willing to engage
in negotiations with the adversary and agree to a compromise solution, but this agreement was also
actually implemented and fully-fledged negotiations for peace were initiated. However, rather than
ushering in a new era of conflict management, this readiness to engage in negotiations was more due
to the domestic situation in Russia at that time. Military failures and high casualties among mostly
very young soldiers during the first months of the Chechnya War exposed organizational and
personnel shortcomings in the Russian army and led to increased discontent among the population.
Furthermore, Yeltsin was in the vulnerable position of a soon to be re-elected presidential candidate
and could not afford to turn the electorate against him. Also, on the Chechen side, the will to negotiate
was strong in 1995. For them, “Budennovsk” was a military and political saving hand, as mobilization
of the Russian and international media prevented the drift into a total military deadlock and opened
up the way for the Chechens to be accepted as a party at the negotiation table.
Similarly to “Budennovsk,” the attack of Chechen combatants on Beslan School No. 1 in
September 2004 was also intended by the hostage-takers to force the Russian side to accept peace,
and to immediately withdraw its troops from Chechnya. However, since 1995, the situation had
significantly changed: the parties had hardened, the access for independent media and civil society to
the conflict zone was blocked, and all of the pronounced goals of the hostage-takers were not
achieved. Locally, this de facto signified the end of the Chechen insurgency.
CONCLUSION
The present article has identified the different mnemonic actors and their narratives about two
episodes of the Chechnya Wars, the hostage crises in Budennovsk (June 1995) and Beslan.
(September 2004) Similar in terms of setting and the intention of the hostage-takers, the two hostagecrises were turning points in the course of the war and potential openings for negotiations between
the conflicting parties. However, the local, national, and international contexts in 1995 and 2004 were
markedly different and had a defining impact on the prospects for peace.
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Following conceptual reflections on “ripeness” (I. W. Zartman 2015; 2001) and “readiness”
(Pruitt 2015; Kleiboer 1994), the situation in 1995 was rather promising for negotiations and the
opportunity was at least partially seized by key actors on both sides. With the support of the OSCE
as a third-party mediator this resulted in an inclusive process of negotiation and a partial peace
agreement, including a ceasefire and demilitarization, as well as a declared commitment to broader
negotiations on the political status of Chechnya in the future. In 2004, on the other hand, the moment
was not “ripe” for negotiations at any level: there was a stalemate, but it was not “mutually hurting,”
because it unilaterally suppressed the Chechen side by military force. Furthermore, legitimate actors
who would have been willing and able to push for a negotiated solution were blocked or killed on
both sides. And last, but not least, the political context was different in 2004, with a severely
decimated and internally divided Chechen independence movement at the local level, a consolidated
and increasingly authoritarian and militarized political apparatus at the level of the Russian state, and
a clear international prioritization of the global “War on Terror” at the expense of local human rights
and freedoms of self-determination.
However, context is not the only thing that matters. A key finding of this article is the
influence of internal divisions on the “ripeness” of the conflict and the “readiness” of the involved
actors for a negotiated settlement. The article identifies “doves,” who seek a negotiated solution and
a full-fledged settlement of the conflict, and “hawks,” who push for a unilateral, military peace on
both the Russian and Chechen sides. During the two episodes examined here, however, the
distribution of power between these two internal groups was unequal, which had a considerable
impact on the dynamics of the conflict and the prospects of a settlement. After “Budennovsk”(1995),
the situation was rather advantageous for “doves”: the “hawks” in Russia had not been able to deliver
the swift military victory they had hoped for, the political landscape was highly fragmented, and the
political establishment and the security sector were kept in check by an active and fairly strong civil
society. On the Chechen side, the key actors were united in their fight against the Russian aggressor
and stood firmly behind the idea of their own national project. With “Beslan” (2004), on the other
hand, the “hawks” on the Russian side consolidated their position, and access was blocked from the
outset for “doves” willing to negotiate and for critical civil society actors. Similarly, on the Chechen
side the radical forces had strengthened and the various groups were strongly divided among
themselves. As a result, the “peace” that followed the end of the armed struggle in 2004 was less than
ever based on a negotiated settlement involving various conflict parties and interest groups; instead,
these negotiations meant that a unilateral Pax Russica was maintained through the use of massive
control and military force.
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ANNEX 1: RIPENESS
Contextual
elements
supporting or
preventing
negotiations

1995
Budennovsk hostage crisis

Local
developments
(Chechnya,
North
Caucasus)

- Chechen nationalist movement
at its heights (+++)
- Effect
of
“Budennovsk” consolidation of Chechen
statehood (+++/---)
- First Chechnya War ongoing;
heavy military losses on both
sides (+++)

Political fragmentation of the
Chechen nationalist movement (---)
Second Chechnya War ongoing;
war fatigue of Chechen population
and government (+++)
Regionalization and Islamization
of the insurgency in the
North Caucasus (---)

National
developments
(RF)

- RF: Yeltsin prepares re-election
(+++)
- 1993 Constit. Crisis 
vulnerability+fragmentation of state
(+++/---)
- Consolidation of the security sector
(---)
- First Chechnya War ongoing; heavy
military
losses on both sides (+++)
- Active civil society (+++)
- Active role of indep. media
publication
- of Chechen grievances (+++)

2000 Putin to power; consolidation
of central government; no need
to accommodate political adversaries
(---)
“Counter-terrorism” as a new masternarrative; legitimization of the use
of force (---)
Participation of civil society blocked
(---)
Selective media coverage (---)

International
developments
(Western
states and
international
organizations)

- Western states and IO’s reluctant
to interfere in Chechnya war,
in order not to weaken the
Yeltsin government (---)
- Russian and international
human rights movement
excerts pression to react on
Chechen grievances (+++)

2004
Beslan hostage crisis

-

-

-

Global “War on Terror”; delegation
of power to deal with Chechen
separatism as a domestic matter. (---)

Sources: table conceptually inspired by the “ripeness” and “readiness” literature, see notably (I. W.
Zartman 2001; 2015), (Pruitt 2015) and (Kleiboer 1994).
Legend of symbols:
(+++)
Element supporting “ripeness”
(---)
Element hampering “ripeness”
(+++/---)
Element with unclear impact
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ANNEX 2: AVAILABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF ACTORS
Contextual elements
supporting
or preventing
negotiations
Chechen combatants and
government

1995
Budennovsk hostage crisis

-

-

Russian armed forces
and government

-

Russian civil society

-

International community
and Chechen diaspora

-

Alternatives
to continuation
of armed conflict (“Way
out”) settlement

-

2004
Beslan hostage crisis

Hostage-takers at home celebrated as heroes (+++/---)
Head of military staff A.
Maskhadov committed
to negotiations in the military field
 Khasavyurt ceasefire agreement (August 1996) (+++)
Chechen hardliners try to block
negotiations, want military victory
(---)

De-legitimization of hostage-takers
as destroyers of Che. statehood (---)
End of Chechen independence
movement  no legitimate partner
for negotiations. (---)
Radicalization and Islamization of field
commanders (e.g. Basayev); turn
towards Islamist “djihad” (---)

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
supports opening of negotiations.
(+++)
Moderated representatives
of the security sector (General
Lebed) support negotiations
CF agreement of Khasavyurt,
Aug 1996 (+++)
Radical forces in RF government
and sec.
sector block negotiation of peace
agreement (---)

Heroization of the Russian security
forces; prevailing of “counterinsurgency” and “no negotiations”
approach. (---)

Russian human rights defenders
and parliamentarians
participant in public debates
and are mandated to negotiate with
the Chechen side (+++)
OSCE as an active third-party
mediator (+++)

Sectorial negotiations for peace
launched after June 1995; inclusive
mechanism created for potential
peace agreement; signature
of Khasavyurt Agreement (+++)

-

- Potential third party mediators blocked
by Russian security actors
(“securitization” of the insurgency in
the North Caucasus) (---)
- International community refrains
from interference, defines “War
on Terror” in the North Caucasus
as Moscow’s domestic matter. (---)
- Unilateralism (“Pax Russica” and
Chechenization) instead of negotiated
settlement; domination of one actor
forcing the other side to exile or
underground. (---)

Sources: table conceptually inspired by the “ripeness” and “readiness” literature, see notably (I. W.
Zartman 2001; 2015), (Pruitt 2015) and (Kleiboer 1994).
Legend of symbols:
(+++)
Element supporting availability and willingness
(---)
Element hampering availability and willingness
(+++/---)
Element with unclear impact
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NOTES
1. See the June 1995 interview with Basayev shared in (Lavrentyeva 2014).

2. The national “Day of solidarity in the fight against terrorism” was enshrined in June 2005 in the
amended Federal law on “Victory Days” of the Russian Federation (President of the Russian
Federation 2005).
3. For the state-sponsored construction of a glorifying memory of the security forces in Beslan, see
also (Charny 2019).
4. It was through the same platform that Basayev announced in form of a letter his authorship of
“Beslan” in late September 2004, see (Kavkazcenter 2004).
5. It is striking that the combatants involved in the hostage-taking in Beslan were Muslims from the
entire North Caucasus and even from abroad. According to Basayev's confession letter published on
Kavkazcenter.com in September 2004, the group of combatants consisted of “12 Chechen men, 2
Chechen women, 9 Ingush, three Russians, 2 Arabs, 2 Ossetians, 1 Tatar, 1 Kabardinian and 1 Guran”
(Kavkazcenter 2004).
6. For details about the concept of “securitization” see the theory of the same name developed by the
Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). For Moscow’s “securitization” of the North
Caucasus and Chechnya more specifically, see (Wilhelmsen 2018; Snetkov 2014).
7. For the discursive construction of the threat of terrorism and the justification of drastic countermeasures, such as military cleansing and the abolition of civic rights, see also (Lynch 2005).
8. Due to the perceived failure of the federal security forces, a number of high-ranking officials were
removed from their posts in 1995; in particular, the head of FSB, Sergey Stepashin, the Minister of
Nationalities, Nikolay Yegorov and the Interior Minister, Victor Yerin (Hockstader 1995; Adamenko
2020). However, except for Yegorov they soon reappeared on the political scene in a different
capacity.
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